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ANONYMITY AND DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP
James A. Gardner*
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF ANONYMOUS PARTICIPATION IN
DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES
Around this time of year—the fall of an election campaign—if you google my
name, here is what you typically will find.  The first entry about me is usually my
faculty web page.  I like that.  My professional identity has a lot to do with how I think
of myself, and it certainly is the main reference point for my activities in the public
sphere.  It is an identity that I actively manage and can control to some degree, and
it makes sense that this should be the first piece of information someone would find
about me when searching a publicly available resource.
If you scroll down a little further on the first page of search results, however, you
are likely to find a link to The Huffington Post.  This link will not take you to any
material by or about me in the content of The Huffington Post itself, in whose pages
I doubt my name has ever appeared.  Instead, it will take you to a page created by The
Huffington Post that instantaneously culls from Federal Election Commission dis-
closure information all financial contributions I have recently made to candidates for
federal office, along with a map showing the location of my home.
I don’t like that at all.  First, it’s creepy, and a little frightening—what if some nutty
supporter of the opponent of a candidate to whom I contributed decides to retaliate? 
This site literally furnishes a road map.  Still, that possibility is so remote that I don’t
give it any thought.  What does bother me, however, is the much likelier prospect that
my students, looking casually for information about me in a moment of boredom, are
directed almost immediately to an aspect of my political life that I would rather they not
know, or at least that I wish they had to work much harder to learn.  This is because
I teach Constitutional Law, a politically loaded subject in which it is very easy for stu-
dents to dismiss—and therefore to fail to profit from—the teaching of professors whom
they view as tainted by partisanship.  I take great pains in this course to maintain an
appearance of ideological and partisan neutrality, and I am convinced that it heightens
my effectiveness for a very wide range of students.  I try, in other words, to maintain
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a certain anonymity in my political life insofar as my students are concerned, even
though I do not generally seek such anonymity in other domains of my life.  In breach-
ing my contextual anonymity, The Huffington Post—and indirectly the Federal Election
Commission, whose resources are apparently organized in a way that makes this use
possible—undermines my efforts to control the way I present myself in different
domains, with potentially negative ramifications for my effectiveness in one of these
domains: my life as a professional teacher of Constitutional Law.
I find this mildly upsetting, but should anyone really care?  Is the disclosure to my
students of my political contributions in fact beneficial, and if so, to whom—to me? 
To my students?  To the general public?  Are my reservations reasonable, or unduly
self-centered?  Disclosure of my contributions in this format has not thus far affected
my behavior.  Should it?  Would our political system be worse off if people in situa-
tions like mine stopped contributing to avoid disclosure, or is that precisely the decision
to which citizens who wish to participate in politics ought to be put?
***
Because Americans so often reductively equate democratic politics with voting,
when we think of anonymity in democratic politics we typically think mainly of the
secret ballot.  But political participation in modern democratic life can take many
forms:1 financial contributions to candidates, political parties, and advocacy groups;
petition signing; political speech and debate; communication with and lobbying of
officials; attending public meetings; holding office; and any of a host of other obliga-
tions of citizenship such as paying taxes, obeying the law, or performing public ser-
vice or charitable work in one’s community.2  Any or all of these may in principle be
performed on a public stage in the full glare of the public spotlight; or anonymously,
without any or with only very limited public knowledge and awareness; or in a vast
middle ground where actors may be connected to their political actions in only some
respects, in only some domains, or for only some observers.
Numerous recent developments have called into question not only the legality but
also the soundness as a matter of public policy of rules and practices granting or deny-
ing anonymity to political actors in a wide variety of situations.  Just last Term, the
Supreme Court upheld a state law requiring public disclosure of ballot initiative peti-
tions in a manner that reveals the names and addresses of the signers.3  Another decision
from last Term, Citizens United v. FEC,4 invalidated restrictions on corporate cam-
paign spending out of general treasury funds.5  The prospect of significantly increased
1 SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN
POLITICS (1995).
2 See id. at 42.
3 Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010).
4 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
5 Id. at 913.
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corporate political spending has generated a flurry of proposals to tighten disclosure
requirements in an effort to ensure publicity of the ultimate sources of funding for
campaign advertisements.6  At the same time, troubling questions have been raised
about the utility of public disclosure of the names of individuals who contribute only
small amounts to candidates and political organizations.7  Lurking behind many of
these questions appears to be underlying doubt about the propriety and value of anony-
mous political speech, especially in the internet age of easy access both to potentially
huge audiences and to the cloak of anonymity, a set of conditions that differs signifi-
cantly from those obtaining when the Court last confronted the constitutionality of
prohibitions on anonymous campaign speech.8
Although judicial decisions establish some parameters, it is clear that the law does
not begin to solve all the potential problems that might arise in this area, and that leg-
islatures have a great deal of latitude to protect or destroy the anonymity of political
participation.  Whether and to what extent they should promote, tolerate, or discourage
anonymity is therefore a live and potentially significant question.  My goal here is to
provide a framework for thinking about such policy choices, and indirectly the way
they might be resolved in legal disputes.
The significance of anonymity as a political practice, if indeed it has any, lies in
its capacity to affect the behavior of those who participate in democratic politics: ano-
nymity has been both praised for freeing citizens to vote and speak their true beliefs,9
and condemned for providing convenient cover to harmful or democratically undesir-
able behavior.10  Any attempt to evaluate policies permitting anonymity must therefore
6 The most prominent of these is the so-called “DISCLOSE Act” introduced in Congress,
Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections (DISCLOSE) Act,
H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. (2010), which passed the House but not the Senate. See 156 CONG.
REC. S6278, S6285 (daily ed. July 27, 2010).
7 See Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J. 273, 276,
300–01 (2010); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Disclosures About Disclosure, 44 IND. L. REV. 255,
280–82 (2010); William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre’s Persona: Bringing Privacy Theory
to Election Law, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 859, 864 (2011).
8 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
9 See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64–65 (1960) (“Persecuted groups and sects . . .
throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously
or not at all. . . . It is plain that anonymity has sometimes been assumed for the most construc-
tive purposes.”); People v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978, 989 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) (“Anonymity
has been, historically, the medium of dissidents, shielding them from the retaliatory power
of the establishment and . . . encouraging them to express unpopular views.”); see also JOHN
H. WIGMORE, THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT SYSTEM AS EMBODIED IN THE LEGISLATION OF
VARIOUS COUNTRIES 52–53 (Boston, Boston Book Co. 2nd ed. 1889) (arguing that the secret
ballot allows for the “free and honest expression of the convictions of every citizen”).
10 See Canon v. Justice Court for Lake Valley Judicial Dist., 393 P.2d 428, 435 (Cal. 1964)
(“[A]nonymity all too often lends itself, in the context of attacks upon candidates in the pre-
election period, to smears, as a result of which the electorate is deceived.”); Morefield v.
Moore, 540 S.W.2d 873, 874–75 (Ky. 1976) (arguing that anonymity is “unnecessary” and
“repulsive” to democratic objectives of honesty and fairness in the context of public elections);
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assess and evaluate the kind of behavior anonymity elicits from political actors.  In
this paper, I approach this problem in two steps.  Before we can judge a policy’s effects
on political behavior we need to know how democratic citizens ought to behave.  I
thus begin by identifying some common and widely shared baseline norms of good
democratic citizenship.  Next, I turn to the available empirical evidence to assess
whether practices of political anonymity in fact induce citizens to act in ways that are
closer to or farther from the ideal.  This analysis suggests two preliminary and not very
satisfying conclusions.  First, the effect of anonymity on behavior is so highly contin-
gent and context-dependent that generalizations are both difficult and risky.  Second,
policies regarding anonymity are likely to have an effect on behavior of the citizenry
only at the margins—many or perhaps most people, that is, would probably behave
the same way in most circumstances whether or not they can do so anonymously.  In
the end, more research is needed addressed specifically to the effect of anonymity on
behavior in the political arena.
I. ANONYMITY AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP
There is no single, “correct” way to structure or conduct democratic politics.  On
the contrary, principles of democracy may be institutionalized in a great many ways,
and the decision to adopt one set of practices instead of others necessarily involves
making choices that can have significant implications for the kind of politics that ulti-
mately emerges.  Like any of a host of other choices, the choice between regimes of
anonymity and publicity thus holds greatest relevance as a factor contributing to the
quality of public life and to our ability to achieve the goals that lead us in the first
place to choose democracy as a form of political and social organization.
Anonymity11 has potential significance for the practice of politics in at least two
ways.  First, practices of anonymity permit political actors to conceal two kinds of
Commonwealth v. Evans, 40 A.2d 137, 138–39 (Pa. 1944) (removal of the cloak of anonymity
“raise[s] the ethical standards of political discussion, . . . promote[s] fair play and fair com-
petition in politics, . . . banish[es] cowards from the political arena, and extirpate[s] the dirty
business of surreptitious character assassination”); see also JOHN STUART MILL, Considerations
on Representative Government, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 205, 354 (John Gray ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1991) (1926) (arguing that secret ballots lead to selfish voting in violation
of democratic duty to vote for the “public good”).
11 I use the term “anonymity” rather than “privacy” here because, although there is some
overlap between the two concepts, they may usefully be distinguished for present purposes, and
because anonymity is closer than privacy to the phenomenon I wish to explore. Both privacy
and anonymity have concealing functions, but what they conceal tends to differ. As I under-
stand the terms, privacy generally conceals that a thing has been done. Anonymity, in contrast,
generally conceals only who has done a thing, not that it has been done. Sexual behavior, for
example, is usually conceived as private rather than anonymous because what is appropriately
concealed is that sexual activity has occurred. The participants, of course, typically know each
other (though they need not, in which case the sex would also be anonymous). Voting is
usually conceived as anonymous rather than private because we know people have voted, and 
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information about themselves that is quintessentially relevant to democratic political
decision making: (1) where they stand on questions before the citizenry or the elec-
torate; and (2) the intensity of their feelings and preferences.  Anonymity permits
citizens to conceal their substantive views on politically salient questions when it per-
mits them to avoid being connected to actions that they take or in which they par-
ticipate that have the political effect of providing support for a particular candidate,
measure, or viewpoint.  The most obvious example of this effect of anonymity is the
secret ballot, which casts a cloak of anonymity around the actual votes of eligible citi-
zens, but other practices can have similar effects.  For example, rules protecting the
anonymity of political speakers also prevent others from linking an individual to a
particular point of view expressed in an anonymous communication.
Likewise, anonymity also in certain circumstances permits political actors to
conceal the intensity of their substantive political preferences.  For example, as the
Supreme Court has frequently observed, financial contributions to a candidate for office
express not only an underlying substantive preference for the policies to which that
candidate is committed, but also, by their magnitude, give at least some rough indica-
tion of how strongly the contributor feels.12  The same is true of almost any action
taken in support of a political cause.  A voter’s speech in casual conversation might
communicate his or her support of some particular candidate or measure, but talk can
be cheap.  In contrast, the voter’s willingness to invest the additional effort of actually
casting a ballot, signing a petition, writing a letter, attending a meeting, or volunteer-
ing for a campaign, for example, all communicate a level of intensity of feeling and
commitment that mere speech might not disclose.
Even more fundamentally, however, anonymity can permit citizens to lead a cer-
tain kind of life—one that is segmented and therefore lacks a certain unity or, to use
we know how many and what the vote totals are, but we just don’t know who has cast which
votes. Voting may also be private in the sense that whether a particular individual has voted or
not may be unknown, though it is recorded and in that sense known within a certain circle.
Typically, people do not consider the fact that they have voted to be information that needs
to be concealed in the same way as the actual votes they have cast.
There is obviously some overlap between the concepts. Because privacy conceals that a
thing has been done, it often necessarily also conceals who has done it. Yet people who act
in privacy often are known to one another, and so describing a private act as anonymous may
not add much.
Another way in which the two concepts differ is in the risk of public disclosure: acts
performed anonymously typically are less liable to discovery than those performed privately.
Because privacy does not imply anonymity to those who observe or participate, private acts—
along with the identity of the actor—may be revealed by a potentially large number of people,
increasing the risk of complete disclosure. Anonymous acts, in contrast, are rendered anony-
mous precisely by the fact that nearly or literally no one is capable of linking the actor to the
act, and thus the risk of disclosure is very low. However, I want to make clear that I do not dis-
pute that there may be many circumstances in which the functional difference between privacy
and anonymity may not much matter.
12 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 135 (2003);
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386 (2000).
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a normatively more loaded expression, integrity.  That is because one of the central
effects of anonymity is to permit citizens to say things or to display certain kinds of
behavior in one domain of life and then contradict themselves, in word or deed, in
another.  The secret ballot, for example, permits an individual to announce support
for a candidate or position in one setting and then in the privacy of the voting booth
to vote for a candidate or measure taking a contrary position.13  Anonymity in polit-
ical speech permits a citizen to say one thing among friends or associates and then,
without detection, to publish an anonymous attack on that same position.  Anonymity
in political contributions permits an individual to profess support for a principle in
one domain and then contribute without fear of exposure to organizations dedicated
to undermining it.
This characteristic of anonymity can have obvious ramifications for how people
act in the political arena.  It permits behavior that is variable and inconsistent because
it is untested—and often untestable—against observable behavior in other settings. 
Perhaps worse, anonymity permits citizens to speak and act insincerely in certain as-
pects of their political lives.  For example, practices of anonymity in public opinion
polling and in voting are often thought to give rise to the commonplace observation
of a significant gap between the proportion of white voters who claim to pollsters that
they plan to vote for black candidates and those who actually do so.14  On the other
hand, anonymity is also frequently credited with permitting citizens to speak and be-
have honestly by insulating them from pressures of observation that might inhibit their
willingness to speak and act consistently with their own views.  Anonymity is often
credited, for example, with facilitating political dissent during the American revolu-
tionary period15 and, following introduction of the secret ballot, in freeing voters from
coercion by officials and parties.16
13 See MILL, supra note 10, at 355; Geoffrey Brennan & Philip Pettit, Unveiling the Vote,
20 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 311, 326 (1990).
14 This phenomenon is sometimes known as the “Bradley Effect” after Tom Bradley, the Los
Angeles mayor who lost the California gubernatorial race in 1982 despite being ahead in the
polls immediately preceding Election Day. For a description, see Gregory S. Parks & Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Implicit Bias, Election ‘08, and the Myth of a Post-Racial America, 37 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 659, 702–09 (2010). Several other examples of this kind of behavior are described
in Adrian Vermeule, Open-Secret Voting 6–7 (Harv. L. Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working
Paper Series, Paper No. 10-37, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1646435.
15 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 360–69 (1994) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
16 Or at least that was its avowed purpose. There is some evidence, however, that the intro-
duction of the secret ballot simply shifted at least some amount of coercion and bribery into
other forms, including inducing voters of the opposing party to stay home through bribery, Gary
W. Cox & J. Morgan Kousser, Turnout and Rural Corruption: New York as a Test Case, 25
AM. J. POL. SCI. 646, 654–56 (1981), or physical intimidation, TRACY CAMPBELL, DELIVER THE
VOTE: A HISTORY OF ELECTION FRAUD, AN AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION—1742–2004,
at 99–102 (2005). It also seems to have encouraged other forms of illicit behavior such as dis-
enfranchisement, id. at 102–06, intimidation of officials responsible for counting ballots, id.
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The ways in which anonymity is capable of influencing the behavior of citizens
and the nature of their actions in the political arena raise important questions about
how we ought to evaluate it.  First, what kind of life is suitable for democratic citizens
to lead?  Must it have some unity or integrity?  Is it permissible for citizens to lead
political lives that are in some sense divorced from or even inconsistent with the lives
they lead in the spheres of family, work, and the local community?
Second, what kind of judgment do democratic citizens owe their fellow citizens? 
Do they owe judgments that are founded in, and thus consistent with, a unified and
well-considered life?  Or is it sufficient (or even desirable) for citizens to treat their
political lives as distinct domains and to act in politics consistent with a persona that
exists solely or mainly for purposes of political action?  Ought citizens to be able to
conceal or misrepresent their positions, beliefs, and intensity of feelings while acting
in the political arena?  Do they owe their fellow citizens judgments that are in some
sense “honest” and “true,” or merely ones that are publicly acceptable?17
Finally, what is the effect of anonymity, where it occurs, on citizen behavior?  Does
it induce or facilitate behavior that is consistent with democratic ideals?  Does ano-
nymity teach any particular kind of civic lessons, or invite citizens to draw any par-
ticular kinds of conclusions, about the proper forms of democratic behavior, and if so
is the lesson the right one?
None of these questions can be answered without reference to some conception
of what democratic citizenship ideally requires.  In the next section I review some basic
principles of democratic theory to help generate accounts of democratic citizenship
against which contemporary practices of anonymity might be evaluated.  That will put
us in a better position to determine whether the kinds of effects that anonymity may
have on political behavior moves us toward or away from the standards of democratic
behavior to which citizens ought to aspire.
II. DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND IDEALS OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR
Although there are almost as many democratic theories as there are democratic
theorists, for the most part contemporary accounts of democracy tend to fall into one
of two categories often designated in consideration of their historical antecedents as
liberal or republican, or in consideration of their most prominent conceptual features
as aggregative or deliberative.18  This section begins with a description of some basic
at 106–10, and the development of secrecy-piercing methods of fraud such as the “chain
ballot,” in which party agents obtained an extra blank ballot, filled it out for their candidates,
and then bribed voters to go into the polls and cast the ballot, but did not pay them until they
came back out with a fresh, blank ballot, a process that could be repeated all day. Id. at 137–38.
17 There is of course a significant definitional question here: if people owe a true or honest
opinion, what counts as one? Or, the better way to ask the question is: what is a politically
salient opinion? One that is self-regarding? Public-regarding? Defensible in principle, using
publicly acceptable reasons? Or of some other kind?
18 IAN SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 10 (2003).
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features of the two main models.  It then explores some common ground between the
models by identifying several traits that both models agree citizens ought to possess,
and that might in principle be influenced by practices of anonymity.  It turns finally to
a brief review of some well-known theoretical perspectives on how anonymity might
affect the behavior of citizens in comparison to these shared ideals.
A. Models of Democracy
The two major contemporary classes of democratic theories, liberal/aggregative
and republican/deliberative, can be conceived as lying roughly at opposite ends of a
spectrum marking the degree to which emphasis is placed on the individuals who com-
prise a society or on the collectively self-governing communities that such individuals
inhabit.  Classic liberal theories of the social contractarian variety, conceived in reaction
to the medieval belief that forms of social and political organization were unchangeable
and prescribed by nature, tend to stress the sovereignty of the individual and to under-
stand participation in politics as guided primarily by every individual’s independent use
of reason.19  On this conception, individuals formulate their political opinions outside
of politics and then make periodic forays into politics for the purpose of asserting their
views and protecting or advancing their personal interests.  This view is understood
as “aggregative” because it conceives of democracy as little more than a mechanism
to determine the political preferences of each individual and “tot them up.”20
More recent extensions of classic liberal democratic theory tend to stress even more
heavily the aggregative aspect of democratic processes.  Classical liberalism saw no
contradiction in conceiving of individuals as obliged simultaneously to answer only
to the dictates of independent reason and to exhibit political virtue by attempting at all
times to advance the common good rather than their private self-interest.21  Modern
utilitarian and economic theories of democracy, in contrast, understand democracy
mainly as a procedure for maximizing social utility by recording and aggregating as
accurately as possible the private self-interest of each citizen.22  The advantage of
democracy on this view is that its inclusivity and transparency permit identification
of utility-maximizing policies more accurately than do other forms of governmental
organization.  However, for such a system to work properly, individuals must attend
19 A leading exemplar is JOHN LOCKE, Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES
OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690); see also SHAPIRO,
supra note 18, at 3.
20 SHAPIRO, supra note 18, at 3.
21 E.g., RICHARD DAGGER, CIVIC VIRTUES: RIGHTS, CITIZENSHIP, AND REPUBLICAN
LIBERALISM 41–60 (1997); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT 127–31 (1996);
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1566–71 (1988). This
result was achieved partly by relocating and thinning natural law from dictating the thick
organization of society to requiring only that individuals act to achieve the common good,
in whatever form and with whatever prescriptions reason might reveal it to possess.
22 ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957).
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primarily to their own self-interest. The common good is achieved in a democracy, but
through the impersonal operation of its aggregating mechanisms rather than through
self-conscious attempts by individuals to determine how to advance it.23
In contrast to liberal/aggregative theories, republican/deliberative theories empha-
size collective deliberation as the distinguishing feature of democracy.24  Such theories
explicitly reject the proposition that a meaningful and legitimately binding public will
can be identified by aggregating the isolated private wills of individual citizens.25  Tak-
ing face-to-face deliberation among political equals as the aspirational model of collec-
tive self-governance,26 theories of deliberative democracy contend that an expression
of the public will can legitimately bind those who are subject to it only insofar as it is
reasoned, well-informed, and formulated after mutual consultation and discussion that
is inclusive, respectful, and aimed at achieving mutually satisfactory agreement among
society’s members—when it is, in a word, deliberative.27
Unlike liberal and economic theories of democracy, deliberative theories do not
conceive of political beliefs and interests as exogenously determined preferences that
citizens bring with them into the political arena.  Instead, deliberative theories under-
stand preferences to be formed endogenously, in the crucible of politics itself, through
the give and take of discussion with other citizens of different views.28  Deliberation
is thus doubly important in these theories: it is not only the forum in which citizens
forge agreement on what to do, but also the very means by which they legitimately
bind themselves to what they have collectively decided.29
Citizens carry a heavy burden in deliberative models of democracy.  When engaged
in democratic deliberation, they must treat each other with mutual respect and civility,30
and must work sincerely and cooperatively toward determining the truth.31  They must
23 Id.
24 Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in THE GOOD POLITY 17, 18
(Alan Hamlin & Philip Pettit eds., 1998).
25 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996) (1992); Cohen,
supra note 24, at 18; IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY (2000).
26 JAMES S. FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: PUBLIC OPINION AND DEMOCRACY 4–5
(1995).
27 Cohen, supra note 24; HABERMAS, supra note 25; YOUNG, supra note 25.
28 Cohen, supra note 24, at 22–23; SHAPIRO, supra note 18, at 22–23; YOUNG, supra note
25, at 6.
29 AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 3–5 (2004).
30 See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 52–53
(1996); JOHN RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in THE LAW OF PEOPLES 129,
136–37 (1999); HENRY S. RICHARDSON, DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY: PUBLIC REASONING ABOUT
THE ENDS OF POLICY 89–91 (2002).
31 Cohen, supra note 24, at 24; David Estlund, Beyond Fairness and Deliberation: The
Epistemic Dimension of Democratic Authority, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON
REASON AND POLITICS 173, 196–97 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997); Gerald F.
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remain open-minded and receptive toward views and perspectives expressed by
others.32  They must support arguments or positions they advance with reasons rather
than mere assertions, and in so doing must confine themselves to invoking “public
reasons,” meaning reasons that all other reasonable citizens might in principle accept,
a category typically said to exclude justifications based on personal self-interest.33 
And they must strive in deliberation to transcend disagreement by persuading others,
rather than attempting to finesse disagreement through strategic bargaining,34 or to
override it through raw exercises of the power of numerical superiority.35
B. Attributes of Ideal Citizenship
For all their fundamental disagreement about the purposes and proper operation of
democracy, both broad classes of democratic theory can agree on at least some of the
traits that an ideal democratic citizen ought to possess.  I shall focus on three of these—
sincerity, independence, and public-mindedness—because they are most clearly rele-
vant to the impact that policies of anonymity might have on the conditions, and thus
the behavioral incentives, that citizens face when acting in the political arena.
Sincerity seems to be favored, and even required, by every theory of democracy. 
Citizens, it seems, should vote, speak, signal support, contribute, sign petitions, and in
general behave in the political arena by acting on and expressing themselves in accor-
dance with their actual beliefs, however those beliefs might ultimately be formulated. 
Deliberative theories tend strongly to disfavor insincerity because it is a form of stra-
tegic behavior that is thought to undermine true deliberative engagement and thus to
impair the ability of deliberators to reach a genuine consensus.36  Utilitarian theories
Gaus, Reason, Justification, and Consensus: Why Democracy Can’t Have It All, in DELIB-
ERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS, supra, at 207–08.
32 GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 30, at 15–16; RICHARDSON, supra note 30, at
143–45; YOUNG, supra note 25, at 3; cf. MELISSA S. WILLIAMS, VOICE, TRUST, AND MEMORY:
MARGINALIZED GROUPS AND THE FAILINGS OF LIBERAL REPRESENTATION (1998) (discussing
the problem of historically marginalized groups’ access to the deliberative process).
33 Joshua Cohen, Democracy and Liberty, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 185, 193–95
(Jon Elster ed., 1998); RAWLS, supra note 30, at 140–41. But see ROBERT E. GOODIN,
REFLECTIVE DEMOCRACY 81–88 (2003) (arguing that bargaining is not inconsistent with
meaningful deliberation); Jane Mansbridge et al., The Place of Self-Interest and the Role of
Power in Deliberative Democracy, 18 J. POL. PHIL. 64, 64, 69 (2010) (rejecting exclusion of
self-interested bargaining from accounts of normatively desirable democratic deliberation).
34 THOMAS CHRISTIANO, THE RULE OF THE MANY: FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN DEMOCRATIC
THEORY 117 (1996); BERNARD MANIN, THE PRINCIPLES OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
198–201 (1997); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 72
(1993).
35 Cohen, supra note 24, at 23; MANIN, supra note 34, at 189–92; RICHARDSON, supra
note 30, at 49–52; YOUNG, supra note 25, at 8.
36 See HABERMAS, supra note 25, at 4; MANIN, supra note 34, at 198–201; SUNSTEIN,
supra note 34, at 72–73. But see GOODIN, supra note 33, at 81–88.
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generally predict that insincerity leads to inefficiency because it obscures the prefer-
ences that must be aggregated for accurate utility-maximization.37  Insincerity is also
sometimes viewed as destructive and even toxic by theories of democracy that under-
stand mutual trust to be an essential foundation of successful democratic life.38  This
shared democratic distaste for insincerity has sometimes been expressed in the United
States in the form of legislative restrictions on false or malicious campaign speech.39
Independence is a second characteristic of good citizenship commended by both
major classes of democratic theory.  Independence plays an especially prominent role
in liberal theories.  Both Kantian theory and its modern Rawlsian variant view the self
as antecedent to its political opinions, meaning that the citizen’s political reasoning
proceeds by hypothesis in isolation from, and thus independently of, the reasoning of
others.40  Indeed, the ability to reason independently has in the Anglo-American tra-
dition often been understood as a minimal requirement for the extension of full rights
of citizenship and political participation.  Thus slaves, women, and the poor were long
excluded from the franchise on the theory that their almost complete economic depen-
dence on their owners, husbands, and employers, respectively, deprived them of the
ability to formulate a political will with the requisite degree of independence.41  Polit-
ical parties also were, and to this day remain, objects of liberal democratic suspicion
for their supposed ability to induce in their adherents a kind of blind loyalty inconsis-
tent with the kind of independent judgment that all citizens have an obligation to under-
take.42  Contemporary rational choice models of democracy take the requirement of
independence to its greatest extreme insofar as they maintain that formal independence
of summed preferences is a condition of accurate calculations of utility maximization.43
Deliberative conceptions of democracy also conceive of independence as a char-
acteristic of the good democratic citizen.  Although deliberation is, to be sure, a social
37 On the other hand, utilitarian theories of democracy have difficulty finding a ground
upon which to condemn strategic insincerity directed to other voters and citizens; presumably
the strategic deployment of insincerity will occur only when individuals calculate such behavior
to be in their interest. Classical liberal theories tend to handle insincerity by resort to ground
norms of virtue (perhaps informed by conceptions of natural law and personal, even republican,
honor). See DAGGER, supra note 21, at 46–57, on cooperation and fair play, which constructs
a theory of cooperation as a necessity of successful collective self-rule.
38 E.g., TRUST AND GOVERNANCE (Valerie Braithwaite & Margaret Levi eds., 1998).
39 See Developments in the Law—Elections, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1111, 1272–98 (1975);
William P. Marshall, False Campaign Speech and the First Amendment, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
285 (2004).
40 MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982).
41 Robert J. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN.
L. REV. 335, 340–41 (1989).
42 Progressives were especially consistent critics of parties on these grounds. See Richard
Hofstadter, Introduction to THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT 1900–1915, at 10 (Richard Hofstadter
ed., 1963); WILLIAM ALLEN WHITE, THE OLD ORDER CHANGETH: A VIEW OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 13–22 (1910).
43 E.g., KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 22–23 (2d ed. 1963).
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and collective activity, effective deliberation demands that citizens enter into and par-
ticipate in deliberation with the independence necessary to recognize, assert, advance,
and defend their own perspectives.44  Independence on this conception, however, does
not mean formal social apartness; rather, citizens incur an obligation in deliberation
to hold themselves open to persuasion and to seek consensus.  As a result, accommo-
dation and deference, either to the collectivity or to individual members, is also part
of the deliberative process.45  By the same token, however, yielding in deliberation to
the opinions and desires of others must issue from a self-conscious decision, under-
taken independently and voluntarily, without coercion, by the actor, if the consensus
sought by deliberation is to count as legitimate.46
Public-mindedness is the third and last quality I will discuss here that is required
of good citizens in both aggregative and deliberative accounts of democracy.  Although
the two classes of theories often disagree on the substantive merits of political justice,
they typically agree that citizens have an obligation to act according to some con-
ception of the collective good.47  Deliberative and republican models require this kind
of public-mindedness very strongly and openly; in such theories the naked pursuit
of self-interest is generally regarded as a profound political error.48
With the prominent exception of contemporary economic theories of democ-
racy49—which I will accordingly set aside as outside the main theoretical consen-
sus—liberal theories of democracy also tend to value public-mindedness.50  Classical
liberalism, for example, placed great stock in the virtue of political actors, meaning
among other things their willingness to pursue the common good.51  And although polit-
ical theorists such as Hume and Madison advocated designing political institutions
44 See the critiques of deliberation based on the view that they ignore the dynamics of
power; e.g., Mansbridge et al., supra note 33; Lynn M. Sanders, Against Deliberation, 25
POL. THEORY 347, 362 (1997).
45 See Estlund, supra note 31, at 181–87.
46 MANIN, supra note 34, at 190–91; WILLIAMS, supra note 32, at 23.
47 The one prominent exception is economic theories of democracy, which conceive of
citizens as having no obligation in the political arena beyond advancing their self-interest to
the extent they deem worthwhile. See, e.g., DOWNS, supra note 22, at 36 (“[E]ach citizen
casts his vote for the party he believes will provide him with more benefits than any other.”).
For this reason, I will from this point forward drop the economic account from my dis-
cussion, even of liberal democratic theory. I believe this is justified, however, because of the
descriptive and normative weakness of the strongest forms of economic and rational choice
theories of democracy.
48 See, e.g., CHRISTIANO, supra note 34, at 6; GOODIN, supra note 33, at 18; CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 20–21 (1993).
49 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
50 See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 30, at 136; SHAPIRO, supra note 18, at 3.
51 See HENRY ST. JOHN, THE IDEA OF A PATRIOT KING (Sydney W. Jackman ed., Bobbs-
Merrill Co. 1965); Edmund Burke, Speech at the Conclusion of the Poll (Nov. 3, 1774), in
3 THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE 64, 69 (Warren M. Elotson & John A.
Woods eds., 1996); THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
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on the assumption that “every man ought to be supposed a knave,”52 it is clear that
knavery was understood as the consequence of the predictable failure of human beings
to live up to their own ideals, not as a behavioral aspiration in itself.53  Modern liberal
theories in the Kantian tradition frequently claim that the route to justice lies in the will-
ingness and capacity of citizens to attempt to transcend their own self-interest by striv-
ing for impartiality, self-effacement, and open-mindedness in both private reflection
and public deliberation,54 and this imposes on them an obligation to undertake their
public political acts consistent with these normative commitments.
C. Anonymity in Democratic Theory
Although the literature of democratic theory is vast, little has been written from
any perspective concerning the compatibility of citizen anonymity with the theoretical
premises of democracy.55  Occasionally, the attitude of political theorists toward ano-
nymity may be inferred from other aspects of their writings.  Hannah Arendt, for ex-
ample, whose work falls primarily on the civic republican side of the ledger, argues
that the classical vita activa provides the best and only feasible model for meaningful
political life.56  “Speech and action,” according to Arendt, “are the modes in which
human beings appear to each other, not indeed as physical objects, but qua men.”57 
In so appearing to each other, Arendt maintains, “the primordial and specifically human
act must at the same time contain the answer to the question asked of every newcomer:
‘Who are you?’”58  That question, Arendt contends, is revealed by both words and
deeds, enacted on a public stage.59  On this view, anonymity seems deeply contrary to
the fundamental requirements of a good political life.
To the extent that deliberative theories of politics take for their model the intimate,
face-to-face, and intrinsically non-anonymous political life of the ancient agora,60
52 DAVID HUME, Of the Independency of Parliament, in ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND
LITERARY 42 (Eugene F. Miller ed., rev. ed. 1987) (italics omitted).
53 E.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 10, 51 (James Madison). Madison notes, “[T]he effect may
be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may . . . first
obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests of the people . . . . [This possibility, along with
hard experience,] has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.” THE FEDERALIST
NO. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
54 E.g., BRIAN BARRY, JUSTICE AS IMPARTIALITY (1995); James Bohman, Citizenship and
Norms of Publicity: Wide Public Reason in Cosmopolitan Societies, 27 POL. THEORY 176,
177–78 (1999).
55 See, e.g., David Stasavage, Polarization and Publicity: Rethinking the Benefits of
Deliberative Democracy, 69 J. POLITICS 59 (2007) (arguing that public deliberation among
legislators may produce substantively worse outcomes than private deliberation, and discussing
the literature on this question).
56 HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 22 (1958).
57 Id. at 176.
58 Id. at 178.
59 Id. at 179.
60 E.g., FISHKIN, supra note 26, at 4–5.
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anonymity would seem to be at least disfavored.  In Aristotelian rhetorical theory, for
instance, “public deliberation is deliberation in the presence . . . of persons of flesh and
blood.”61  As a result, shame plays an important and useful role in teaching citizens the
art of deliberation, but the ability of people to be shamed seems to depend to some
degree upon their identity being known to their interlocutors.62  On the other hand, to
the extent that more contemporary theories place greater emphasis on the role of delib-
eration in facilitating broad democratic consensus and political legitimacy, the fact that
individual interlocutors might or might not be personally known to one another may
be less significant than their ability satisfactorily to advance the conversation.63
The status of anonymity in liberal democratic theory likewise is not well estab-
lished.  Some liberal theorists, beginning from the Kantian proposition that self-
awareness and self-knowledge are preconditions for the meaningful entry of the liberal
self into society and politics, conclude that the self must be afforded some degree of
privacy in order to “enabl[e] individuals to discover what is valuable or important
to them in life”64 and to “mark where individuals continue to maintain authority over
themselves.”65  In this private space, individuals are freed to develop without inter-
ference the essential democratic capacities of learning how “to resist social pressures
to conform with dominant views and [developing] deliberative abilities allowing par-
ticipation in deliberative processes.”66  Or, as Ian Shapiro has succinctly remarked,
“Rawls’s contractor reasons alone.”67
However, it does not follow from the proposition that the liberal self requires
privacy or isolation to develop its capacities or exercise its reason that it requires
anonymity.  Although they overlap, privacy and anonymity are not the same.  It is pos-
sible to act with or in the presence of others to whom one is known, and therefore not
anonymously, yet have those actions remain private in the sense that others will not
learn of them.  Conversely, it is possible to act in full public view of large numbers of
people—without privacy, in other words—and yet to remain anonymous on account
61 Paul Nieuwenburg, Learning to Deliberate: Aristotle on Truthfulness and Public
Deliberation, 32 POL. THEORY 449, 450 (2004).
62 Id. at 450 (“Aristotle stands at the fount of a tradition of political thinkers who connect
publicity with . . . shame.”).
63 Habermas denies the possibility of an organized public sphere. HABERMAS, supra note
25, at 367; see also YOUNG, supra note 25, at 169–70.
64 Annabelle Lever, Privacy Rights and Democracy: A Contradiction in Terms?, 5
CONTEMP. POL. THEORY 142, 149 (2006).
65 H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., Privacy and Limited Democracy: The Moral Centrality
of Persons, 17 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 120, 124 (2000).
66 Antoinette Rouvroy & Yves Poullet, The Right to Informational Self-Determination
and the Value of Self-Development: Reassessing the Importance of Privacy for Democracy, in
REINVENTING DATA PROTECTION? 45, 46 (Serge Gutwirth et al. eds., 2009) (citations omitted).
67 IAN SHAPIRO, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICS 112 (2003). Indeed, the Kantian
citizen reasons not merely alone, but attempts to do so from a “point of view, which abstracts
from all contingent features of oneself, such as social and institutional roles, self-regarding
interests, and particular religious and ethnic identities.” Bohman, supra note 54, at 178.
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of being unknown to them.  Thus, the interests of privacy are not necessarily served
by anonymity, or vice versa.  A solitary walk on the beach or a private weekend in the
country may afford the liberal citizen all the opportunity he or she needs to reason indi-
vidually about his or her beliefs and values; whether the citizen does so anonymously
seems largely irrelevant.
Perhaps the only, and certainly the best-known, political theorist who deals ex-
pressly with political anonymity is John Stuart Mill.  In Considerations on Repre-
sentative Government, Mill argues strenuously against the secret ballot, a reform that
had recently been proposed in Britain.68  According to Mill, the vote is a trust that each
voter holds for the benefit of the public.69  The vote, he contends,
is not a thing in which he [the citizen] has an option; it has no
more to do with his personal wishes than the verdict of a juryman. 
It is strictly a matter of duty; he is bound to give it according to
his best and most conscientious opinion of the public good.70
In order to provide voters with incentives to use the vote for the public rather than
their own private good, “the duty of voting, like any other public duty, should be per-
formed under the eye and criticism of the public” because “the bare fact of having to
give an account of their conduct, is a powerful inducement to adhere to conduct of
which at least some decent account can be given.”71
Thus, according to Mill—in an argument that prefigures the emphasis of modern
theories of deliberative democracy on the giving of “public reasons”72—publicity of
voting will lead citizens to vote responsibly to avoid the embarrassment of having to
give a public accounting of votes that cannot be adequately justified with legitimate
reasons.  Mill does allow that there may be times when the disadvantages of secret vot-
ing may be outweighed by the advantage of freeing voters from coercion, but, he be-
lieves, “in the more advanced states of modern Europe, and especially in this country
[Britain], the power of coercing voters has declined and is declining.”73  The possibility
of coercion does not therefore count for Mill as a justification for secret balloting.
Mill’s argument, however, is speculative and indeed rests on contestable empirical
premises.  Is it really so clear that voters will feel shame if called upon to account for
their votes?  Will they really suffer embarrassment if forced to confess that they voted
out of self-interest?  Before whom will the voter actually stand embarrassed, and are
those the same people whose approval the voter respects and craves?  Is it even clear
that “the public” will demand an account of votes cast, or will attend to it if one is
68 MILL, supra note 10, at 353–55.
69 Id. at 353.
70 Id. at 354.
71 Id. at 355, 360.
72 RAWLS, supra note 30, at 131–33.
73 MILL, supra note 10, at 356.
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offered?  Indeed, much of what might count as theoretical consideration of anonymity
likely rests on similarly contingent and empirical assumptions.  Will voters engaged
in public deliberation feel more or less comfortable in advancing their own views sin-
cerely when they are anonymous or when they are identified?  Will they behave more
or less public-regardingly if they are anonymous?  It seems difficult to say a priori,
which is perhaps why democratic theory devotes relatively little contemplation to
anonymity understood as a particular and contingent ground-level practice.
Because the guidance offered by democratic theory is so limited, I now turn to
empirical evidence concerning the effect of anonymity on behavior.
III. THE EFFECTS OF ANONYMITY ON POLITICAL BEHAVIOR: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Despite the many aspects of contemporary political life that either are now con-
ducted under some kind of regime of anonymity or are subject to competing claims
concerning whether they should be so conducted, very little empirical research has been
undertaken into the actual effect of anonymity on specifically political behavior.  In
this section, I review briefly what little seems to be known about the effect of anonym-
ity in politics, and then turn to other areas in which the effect of anonymity on behavior
has been more thoroughly studied.  Although these studies concern behavior in non-
political spheres, they seem to provide at least some insight into how anonymity might
affect the behavior of citizens acting self-consciously in the political arena, which in
turn may allow us to draw at least some speculative conclusions about the tendency
of anonymity to induce citizens to approach more or less closely to political ideals.
A. The Effect of Anonymity in Politics
The earliest and most far-reaching policy of anonymity to be applied to American
politics was the introduction of the Australian (secret) ballot in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.74  The dominant nineteenth-century mode of voting required
voters to arrive at the polling place, procure a privately printed party ballot from an
agent of one of the contending political parties, step up to a voting window, and in
public view hand over the ballot.75  Because parties typically printed their ballots in
different colors, observers could generally see for whom each person voted.76  After
introduction of the Australian system, voting took place secretly rather than in open
view, and official ballots were printed not by parties, but by governments.77
74 Peter H. Argersinger, “A Place on the Ballot”: Fusion Politics and Antifusion Laws,
85 AM. HIST. REV. 287, 290–91 (1980).
75 RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE AMERICAN BALLOT BOX IN THE MID-NINETEENTH
CENTURY 30 (2004).
76 Jerrold G. Rusk, The Effect of the Australian Ballot Reform on Split Ticket Voting:
1876–1908, 64 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1220, 1221 (1970).
77 MICHAEL E. MCGERR, THE DECLINE OF POPULAR POLITICS: THE AMERICAN NORTH,
1865–1928, at 64 (1986); John D. Buenker, Sovereign Individuals and Organic Networks:
Political Cultures in Conflict During the Progressive Era, 40 AM. Q. 187, 196 (1988).
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The principal justification for introducing the secret ballot, a reform backed
strongly by Progressives, was to break the control that parties were thought to exercise
over voters by depriving them of the ability to enforce discipline at the polls.78  Bribery
and many other forms of coercion were employed frequently in nineteenth-century elec-
tions,79 and party agents were keen to know that their investments in individual voters
were repaid with votes.  Thus, introduction of the secret ballot was intended primarily
to enhance citizen independence and sincerity by freeing voters to vote their actual pref-
erences rather than those of a party to which they felt beholden or that they feared.
Did the introduction of the secret ballot have this effect?  Unfortunately, few con-
clusions can be drawn from the available data.  The introduction of the secret ballot
coincided with two developments in voting patterns: an increase in split-ticket voting
and a decline in voter turnout.80  The increase in split-ticket voting is consistent with the
hypothesis that anonymity freed voters to vote sincerely and independently.  How-
ever, because ballot secrecy was inevitably accompanied by changes to ballot format
that facilitated split-ticket voting, which had previously been very difficult,81 it is un-
clear whether the rise in split-ticket voting is attributable to the privacy of the voting
booth or to the new ballot layouts.82
The decline in turnout also is difficult to interpret.  It is possible that turnout de-
clined because anonymity freed many voters to express their true preferences, which
for many voters was that they preferred not to participate in electoral politics.  Such
voters presumably had previously been brought to the polls only or mainly as a result
of party bribery or coercion.  However, the introduction of the secret ballot occurred
at a time in American history when politics, which had long been one of the principal
forms of public entertainment, was eclipsed by other diversions such as vaudeville,
amusement parks, theater, dance halls, circuses, baseball, boxing, bicycles, and even-
tually movies, phonographs, automobiles, and radio.83  Historians generally credit
78 See Rusk, supra note 76, at 1221.
79 BENSEL, supra note 75, at 57; CAMPBELL, supra note 16.
80 Walter Dean Burnham, The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe, 59
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 7, 13 (1965); Jac. C. Heckelman, The Effect of the Secret Ballot on Voter
Turnout Rates, 82 PUB. CHOICE 107, 109–11 (1995); Rusk, supra note 76, at 1235.
81 Because ballots were printed by parties rather than the government, each ballot listed only
the candidates for office fielded by the party that printed the ballot. MCGERR, supra note 77,
at 64. It was theoretically possible for a voter to vote a split ticket by altering a preprinted
party ballot or by creating his own ballot, but this was complicated by the great length of the
nineteenth-century ballot, the frequent unavailability of information about candidates who were
running lower on the ticket, the difficulty of altering a party ballot without being observed
by potentially hostile party agents, and the prevailing nineteenth-century ethos of strict party
loyalty. BENSEL, supra note 75, at 30–31 (discussing ballot size, lack of complete information,
and party agent pressure at the polls).
82 Jack L. Walker, Ballot Forms and Voter Fatigue: An Analysis of the Office Block and
Party Column Ballots, 10 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 448, 450 (1966).
83 See ROBERT J. DINKIN, CAMPAIGNING IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF ELECTION PRACTICES
96 (1989); MARK LAWRENCE KORNBLUH, WHY AMERICA STOPPED VOTING: THE DECLINE OF
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declining turnout to these and other social forces rather than the secret ballot.84  More-
over, some research suggests that the secret ballot did not eliminate party bribery and
coercion but only channeled it in different directions: instead of paying voters to vote
for their own candidates, parties paid likely supporters of opposing candidates to stay
home.85  If so, then little can be concluded about the impact of the secret ballot on
voting tendencies.86
Another significant policy affecting anonymity in political behavior is the intro-
duction in the late twentieth century of effective mandatory disclosure of financial
contributions to candidates and political organizations following enactment of the
Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) and analogous state-level regulatory require-
ments.87  Prior to FECA, contributions in support of candidates could be made anony-
mously, but after FECA, all contributions to candidates and political committees over
one hundred dollars88 had to be disclosed to the Federal Election Commission.89
The effect of this very wide-ranging change from anonymity to publicity on polit-
ical behavior has never, so far as I know, been directly studied.  Although there is no
obvious evidence that publicity of contributions has deterred or altered the flow of
money, the available raw data is difficult to interpret.  For example, the total amount
contributed to presidential candidates has increased tenfold since the introduction of
disclosure requirements in 1976,90 more than twice the rate of inflation over the same
period.91  This might suggest the absence of a significant deterrent effect, but of course
there is no way of knowing whether even more money would have been given were
contributions permitted to be made anonymously.  Certainly, recent agitation to learn
the identity of big-money contributors to tax-exempt political advocacy organizations—
along with sometimes aggressive criticism of any extension of disclosure require-
ments—suggests the existence of demand in at least some quarters for anonymity of
PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY AND THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN AMERICAN POLITICS 114
(2000); MCGERR, supra note 77, at 148; MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE GOOD CITIZEN: A HISTORY
OF AMERICAN CIVIC LIFE 177 (1998).
84 See, e.g., KORNBLUH, supra note 83, at 114.
85 Gary W. Cox & J. Morgan Kousser, Turnout and Rural Corruption: New York as a
Test Case, 25 AM. J. POL. SCI. 646 (1981).
86 Interestingly, a new study suggests that, contrary to the observed historical correlation,
secret voting increases turnout compared to public voting. Christian R. Grose & Carrie A.
Russell, Avoiding the Vote: A Theory and Field Experiment of the Social Costs of Public
Political Participation (Dec. 3, 2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1310868.
87 Earlier federal disclosure legislation existed, but was widely thought to be ineffective.
See Publicity of Political Contributions Act, ch. 392, 36 Stat. 822 (1910); Melvin I. Urofsky,
Campaign Finance Reform Before 1971, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 1, 18 (2008).
88 This has since been raised to two hundred dollars. 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(3)(A) (2006).
89 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 62–64 (1976).
90 Presidential Fundraising and Spending, 1976–2008, OPENSECRETS, http://www.open
secrets.org/pres08/totals.php?cycle= (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
91 See U.S. DEPT. OF LAB., CONSUMER PRICE INDEX: ALL URBAN CONSUMERS, U.S. CITY
AVERAGE, ALL ITEMS (2011), available at ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt.
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political contributions,92 though again it is unclear whether the elimination of anonymity
would induce any significant change in contribution patterns.
A third situation in which anonymity might conceivably affect political behavior
is in the area of anonymous political speech, particularly speech that occurs online, as
in political websites, blogs, and chatrooms.  Much recent research documents the ways
in which discourse in such fora can become polarized: participants in discussions,
speaking mainly or exclusively to others who are self-selected to share similar points
of view, become caught up in an opinion cascade in which the group talks itself into
consensus positions that are more extreme than those with which most of the partici-
pants began.93  These studies, however, have not focused specifically on the role of
anonymity in political discourse; the primary observational or experimental variable
tends to be the like-mindedness of the participants and the limitation of group contacts
with those of other views.  Thus, it is not clear from the experimental evidence what
effect anonymity by itself has on the vulnerability of homogeneous discussion groups
to polarizing cascades.
Given the paucity of targeted research on the effect of anonymity on political
behavior, it may be worthwhile to examine research conducted to assess the effect
of anonymity on behavior in other arenas.  A brief review of a sampling of the large
body of extant research results leads to some intriguing, if suggestive, hypotheses.
B. The Effect of Anonymity in Other Settings
The impact of anonymity on human behavior has been a frequent subject of study
in many areas of research outside the formal political sphere.  These include the effect
of anonymity on how people answer survey questions, contribute to collaborative
online working groups, react to frustration while driving, make ethical decisions,
evaluate guilt and innocence, and mete out punishment, to name just a few.  What
this research tends repeatedly to show is that the effect of anonymity on behavior is
highly variable and context-dependent.  Anonymity tends to reduce inhibitions, but
the kind of behavior that results from reduced inhibition depends on a host of con-
textual factors: the predispositions of the individual in question, the norms of groups
to which the individual belongs that are made salient by the specific behavior in ques-
tion, the nature of the decision to be made, the immediate context in which it is made,
and so on.  What follows is a very brief and selective review of some of the available
research on anonymity.
92 See, e.g., Griff Palmer, Decision Could Allow Anonymous Political Contributions by
Businesses, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2010, at A25 (discussing corporations’ desire to donate to
political campaigns anonymously via non profit groups).
93 CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 51–88 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble?
Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L. J. 71, 85 (2000).
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Gathering facts and opinions is an important aspect of many enterprises, and it
has often been hypothesized that granting anonymity to those from whom information
is sought would produce more accurate data by freeing respondents to answer more
sincerely.94  A very substantial body of research has failed, however, to find such an
effect.  In controlled experiments that divided subjects into anonymous and identified
groups, no difference in substantive responses was found when researchers posed ques-
tions about unionization to teachers;95 about drug use and attitudes to middle school
students;96 about their professors’ teaching to college students;97 about dangerous be-
havior to at-risk youths in a social service program;98 or about business ethics to mar-
keting professionals;99 as well as in many other settings.100  Thus, anonymity by itself
does not appear to increase independence and sincerity in the contexts evaluated.101
94 See, e.g., Janet H. Malvin & Joel M. Moskowitz, Anonymous Versus Identifiable Self-
Reports of Adolescent Drug Attitudes, Intentions, and Use, 47 PUB. OPINION Q. 557, 557–58
(1983) (“Questionnaires that are responded to anonymously . . . are often used because they
are considered the least likely to be biased.”).
95 Richard C. Wildman, Effects of Anonymity and Social Setting on Survey Responses,
41 PUB. OPINION Q. 74 (1977).
96 Malvin & Moskowitz, supra note 94.
97 Christopher Orpen, The Susceptibility of Student Evaluation of Lecturers to Situational
Variables, 9 HIGHER EDUC. 293 (1980).
98 Frederic G. Reamer, Protecting Research Subjects and Unintended Consequences: The
Effect of Guarantees of Confidentiality, 43 PUB. OPINION Q. 497 (1979).
99 Ishmael P. Akaah, The Influence of Non-Anonymity Deriving from Feedback of Research
Results on Marketing Professionals’ Research Ethics Judgements, 9 J. BUS. ETHICS 949 (1990).
100 See, e.g., Carol Fuller, Effect of Anonymity on Return Rate and Response Bias in a Mail
Survey, 59 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 292 (1974); Leonard I. Pearlin, The Appeals of Anonymity in
Questionnaire Response, 25 PUB. OPINION Q. 640 (1961).
101 A growing body of research does, however, demonstrate that the medium in which
survey questions are put to subjects can influence the content of their answers. For example,
some studies find that respondents answer questions more accurately when those questions
are propounded over the internet than when they are propounded using telephone interviews
or interactive voice recognition technology. See Frauke Kreuter et al., Social Desirability
Bias in CATI, IVR, and Web Surveys: The Effects of Mode and Question Sensitivity, 72 PUB.
OPINION Q. 847, 847 (2008); LinChiat Chang & Jon A. Krosnick, National Surveys via RDD
Telephone Interviewing Versus the Internet: Comparing Sample Representativeness and
Response Quality, 73 PUB. OPINION Q. 641 (2009). However, these studies have not attempted
to isolate the effect of anonymity by comparing anonymous versus identified treatment groups,
so their significance to the body of work under discussion is unclear. Certainly, the different
media utilized in these studies can, under the right circumstances, provide different degrees of
partial anonymity, and in some circumstances might provide complete anonymity to respon-
dents, and they therefore suggest that studies of this type focused more directly on anonymity
might provide illuminating results. At the moment, though, I do not believe they can be taken
to contradict the studies mentioned immediately above in the main discussion.
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In contrast, anonymity has sometimes—but not always—been found to increase
antisocial behavior—in the conceptual language of democratic theory, to decrease
public-mindedness.  In a classic experiment, anonymity was found to increase the
incidence among children of stealing Halloween candy.102  In another, experimental
subjects were asked to deliver shocks to confederates of different races.  Subjects
delivered more severe shocks to black than white targets when they were anonymous
than when they were identifiable.103  However, in another well-known experiment
where subjects were invited to behave aggressively toward volunteers by throwing or
striking them with foam objects, anonymity had no relation to the level of aggressive
behavior.104  In experiments conducted under both field and laboratory conditions,
anonymity increased aggressive driving behavior such as horn-honking and, in lab
conditions using simulators, speeding, running red lights, and crashing.105  In the latter
study, however, the researcher concluded that not only the experimental context but
also “situational and dispositional factors are strong predictors of aggressi[veness]”106—
i.e., that anonymity interacts with other factors in complex ways.
In an experimental setting, anonymous juries were more likely than identifiable
juries to convict when the evidence against the defendant was strong, and to view the
process as fair.107  Anonymous juries also imposed the harshest penalty more fre-
quently than identified juries, although they did not impose harsher penalties across
the board.108  In a different but common kind of experimental setting, subjects were
asked to play the “dictator game,” in which they had complete and unilateral authority
to decide how to divide some benefit, such as money, between themselves and another
subject, anonymity was found to increase selfish resolutions of the game.109  As the
author of one study observed, “the effects of anonymity are quite variable; sometimes
anonymity has been shown to increase transgressions, sometimes it has been shown
to decrease them, and other times anonymity has been found to interact in unpredict-
able ways with other variables.”110
102 Edward Diener et al., Effects of Deindividuation Variables on Stealing Among Halloween
Trick-or-Treaters, 33 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 178 (1976).
103 Edward Donnerstein et al., Variables in Interracial Aggression: Anonymity, Expected
Retaliation, and a Riot, 22 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 236 (1972).
104 Edward Diener, Effects of Prior Destructive Behavior, Anonymity, and Group Presence
on Deindividuation and Aggression, 33 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 497 (1976).
105 Patricia A. Ellison et al., Anonymity and Aggressive Driving Behavior: A Field Study,
10 J. SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 265 (1995); Patricia Ellison-Potter et al., The Effects of
Trait Driving Anger, Anonymity, and Aggressive Stimuli on Aggressive Driving Behavior, 31
J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 431 (2001).
106 Ellison-Potter et al., supra note 105, at 432.
107 D. Lynn Hazelwood & John C. Brigham, The Effects of Juror Anonymity on Jury
Verdicts, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 695, 703–04 (1998).
108 Id. at 706.
109 Terence C. Burnham, Engineering Altruism: A Theoretical and Experimental Investi-
gation of Anonymity and Gift Giving, 50 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 133 (2003).
110 Hazelwood & Brigham, supra note 107, at 698.
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The capacity of computers to permit people to work collaboratively on the same
project from different locations has sparked a considerable amount of research into the
influence of anonymity on behavior online.111  The results have generally been vari-
able and complex.  For example, in one study anonymous online participants disclosed
significantly more personal information about themselves—generally thought to be
a prosocial behavior—in an experimental setting where they were asked to collaborate
in finding a solution to an ethical dilemma.112  In another study, anonymity increased
the number of comments participants made, the degree to which those comments were
critical or probing, and the frequency with which participants embellished ideas ad-
vanced by others, supporting the hypothesis that online anonymity generates a kind
of mutual criticism that is prosocial and constructive.113  Yet another study found that
anonymity in collaborative online work did not affect overall group effectiveness, but
was associated with slower performance, and members of anonymous groups were less
satisfied with the experience.114  Another experiment found that anonymity increased
the susceptibility of individual group members to group norm priming, and that it facili-
tated social transmission of norms within the group115—i.e., supported the proposition
that anonymity has the capacity to increase conformity with social norms.
These and many other studies seem to reveal that the precise effect of anonymity
in any particular situation is uncertain.  For example, theorists often treat anonymity
as disinhibiting.116  Yet how disinhibition affects behavior in any given set of circum-
stances depends upon both the predispositions of the actor and the kinds of social in-
hibitions that publicity would otherwise invoke.  If anonymity is disinhibiting, then it
may facilitate antisocial behavior if the individual is predisposed to such behavior and
the social pressures to which he or she ordinarily is publicly exposed are prosocial, but
anonymity can also facilitate the opposite kind of behavior if these considerations are
reversed.117  According to one particularly sophisticated model of social behavior,
the effect of anonymity depends heavily on the context.  Anonymity, under this view,
“serves to strengthen the impact of social norms” in times “when a social identity is
salient,” but “when a personal identity is salient, the same anonymity will reduce
111 Id. at 188.
112 See, e.g., Adam N. Joinson, Self-Disclosure in Computer-Mediated Communication:
The Role of Self-Awareness and Visual Anonymity, 31 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 177 (2001).
113 Leonard M. Jessup et al., The Effects of Anonymity on GDSS Group Process with an
Idea-Generating Task, 14 MIS Q. 313 (1990); see also Terry Connolly et al., Effects of
Anonymity and Evaluative Tone on Idea Generation in Computer-Mediated Groups, 36
MGMT. SCI. 689 (1990).
114 Boris B. Baltes et al., Computer-Mediated Communication and Group Decision Making:
A Meta-Analysis, 87 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 156 (2002).
115 Tom Postmes et al., Social Influence in Computer-Mediated Communication: The Effects
of Anonymity on Group Behavior, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1243 (2001).
116 John Suler, The Online Disinhibition Effect, 7 CYBERPSYCHOL. & BEHAV. 321 (2004).
117 Connolly et al., supra note 113; Joseph S. Valacich et al., A Conceptual Framework of
Anonymity in Group Support Systems, 1 GROUP DECISION & NEGOTIATION 219 (1992).
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the impact of social norms, and increase the person’s adherence to their [sic] own
personal standards”118 regardless of whether those personal standards are pro- or
antisocial.119  In other words, “relevant norms must be salient in order to elicit the
proper norm-congruent behavior,”120 but salience is a property that is almost entirely
contingent and context-dependent.  As one scholar has perceptively noted:
The concept of disinhibition can lead us astray, into thinking that
what is disinhibited is a more “true” aspect of identity than [those
aspects that undergo] the processes of inhibiting and disinhibit-
ing. . . .  The self does not exist separate from the environment in
which that self is expressed. . . .  In fact, a single disinhibited [self]
probably does not exist at all, but rather a collection of slightly dif-
ferent constellations of affect, memory, and thought that surface
in and interact with different types of . . . environments.121
In sum, then, whether and how anonymity affects behavior in any significant way
seems to depend very much on particularities of context.  Anonymity, in other words,
is socially mediated, and as variable as the myriad social contexts in which it might
be found.
C. Relevance to the Political Setting
The conclusion to which these results point is that the impact of anonymity on any
particular kind of behavior is extremely difficult to predict, and that it will very likely
differ depending on the circumstances.  Of course, the relevance of these findings to
political behavior is unclear; politics might simply be another context in which other-
wise comparable behavior occurs, or it might not.  Assuming, however, that these
findings are in principle relevant, then the effect of anonymity in the political arena
seemingly cannot be predicted with any degree of certainty.  Whether anonymity in
political speech, financial contributions, petition signing, communication with officials,
or any other activity will enhance or undermine the sincerity, independence, and public-
mindedness with which citizens behave is likely to depend on numerous contextual
factors.  A more modest and defensible conclusion is that anonymity will have such
an effect for some people in some circumstances but not for others.
118 Joinson, supra note 112, at 179 (emphasis added).
119 Martin Lea et al., Knowing Me, Knowing You: Anonymity Effects on Social Identity
Processes within Groups, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 526, 527 (2001); Kai
Sassenberg & Tom Postmes, Cognitive and Strategic Processes in Small Groups: Effects of
Anonymity of the Self and Anonymity of the Group on Social Influence, 41 BRITISH J. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 463 (2002).
120 Robert B. Cialdini & Noah J. Goldstein, Social Influence: Compliance and Conformity,
55 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 591, 597 (2004).
121 Suler, supra note 116, at 325.
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If so, this should not be terribly surprising.  Experience suggests that anonymity
sometimes seems to free people to behave more consistently with their better selves,
and at other times seems to free them to behave in ways that are irresponsible and anti-
social.  For example, the same circumstances of anonymous online communication may
cause some people to lose socially useful inhibitions that restrain them from uncivil
discourse, whereas others may lose socially harmful inhibitions that restrain them from
effective dating and courtship.  If politics is just another behavioral context, then there
is no good reason to suppose that the results would be any different in that arena.
IV. ANONYMITY IN ITS CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL CONTEXT
If the effects of anonymity are indeed context-dependent, then whether opportu-
nities for anonymity in contemporary political life might induce citizens to exhibit the
political virtues of sincerity, independence, and public-mindedness cannot be predicted
with any confidence.  Nevertheless, we do know a fair amount about the context in
which contemporary political behavior takes place.  Consequently, although we can-
not without considerably more research do much more than speculate, we may be able
at least to inform our speculation by considering what we know about the actual context
in which political behavior occurs.  Below is a brief and decidedly non-exclusive list
of contextual factors that might be relevant to the degree to which anonymity might
facilitate or impede citizens in comporting themselves consistently with the ideals of
democratic theory.
1.  Hard coercion.  The single most important reason why citizens might wish
to act anonymously in politics is probably to avoid official retaliation by the state
for the expression or advancement of dissenting views.  The threat of such coercion
would presumably raise a considerable obstacle to the sincere expression by citizens
of their political opinions.  Although this is without doubt a significant factor influ-
encing political behavior in many parts of the world today, it seems to be virtually
nonexistent in the contemporary United States; state coercion of votes, financial con-
tributions, or political speech is exceedingly rare, and seems to be confined mainly to
infrequent conflicts in which government employees are pressured to support incum-
bent office holders.122
Of course, the state is not the only entity capable of exerting enough power on
voters to coerce their behavior.  It was, after all, fear of private coercion by political
122 The frequency and seriousness of pressure placed on low-level government employees
to participate in partisan politics prompted such landmark pieces of legislation as the Pendleton
Act of 1883, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403, §§ 11–14, and the Hatch Act, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939),
both of which severely limited the ability of federal employees to engage in political activity.
Even after these and similar reforms changed the default order to one in which elected officials
and their high-level appointees may not pressure ordinary government employees to work for
the incumbent’s reelection, breaches of this norm still occur. See, e.g., James Heaney, City
Hall E-mails Urge Staff to Assist Brown Campaign, BUFFALO NEWS, (Aug 21, 2010, 12: 24
AM), http://www.buffalonews.com/incoming/article1461.ece.
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parties that induced adoption of the secret ballot in the first place.123  Private violence
directed against voters, or the threat of it, was a factor in American electoral politics
during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and for decades Jim Crow
institutionalized a public-private alliance of violence directed against black citizens.124 
Nevertheless, hard private coercion—the credible threat of retaliation by force or other
similarly effective means—seems to be at historic lows in the United States.125  To be
sure, there have recently been a small number of well-publicized incidents in which
threats of private retaliation were issued against citizens who had made financial con-
tributions to certain causes,126 and the effect of even a few such threats may be suffi-
ciently magnified by publicity to gain the attention of a much larger number of voters. 
Still, it seems unlikely that threats of public or private retaliation are sufficiently fre-
quent or sufficiently credible to serve as the proximate cause of any diminution in
citizens’ willingness to participate in politics sincerely.127
2.  Pluralism.  In contrast, one of the most important features of American political
life for purposes of evaluating the impact of anonymity on political behavior surely is
its pluralism.128  Americans frequently hold a variety of substantive views on the merits
of political issues.  Often these views are informed by self-interest, and citizens may
vary considerably in the degree to which they have a stake in or understand their self-
interest to be affected by various policies and politically salient disputes.
More importantly for present purposes, however, Americans also seem to hold a
wide variety of views concerning the behavioral norms appropriate to participation in
politics.129  Some are predisposed to believe that politics is a forum for advancing the
common good.  Others seem predisposed to view politics as a vehicle for advancing
their own self-interest, economic or otherwise.  Some seem to understand politics as
a forum for honest deliberation and sincere persuasion.  Others seem to view politics
as an arena for the exercise of power.  Some find consensus important; others prefer
raw majoritarian domination.  Some value civility, others pugnacious struggle.  Some
123 See Michael Waterstone, Civil Rights and the Administration of Elections—Toward
Secret Ballots and Polling Place Access, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 101, 106–07 (2004).
124 See Gilda R. Daniels, Voter Deception, 43 IND. L. REV. 343, 346–47 (2010).
125 See Mayer, supra note 7, at 20 (discussing the lack of information available on modern
retaliation following disclosures of financial support).
126 Many of these relate to incidents surrounding California’s recent experience with
Proposition 8, a measure that limited the legal definition of marriage to opposite-sex unions.
See Scott M. Noveck, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Legislative Process, 47 HARV.
J. LEGIS. 75, 98–99 (2010).
127 Mayer, after a thorough review of the anecdotal evidence, concludes that “neither the
extent of that perceived risk nor the strength of its effect on behavior is known.” Mayer, supra
note 7, at 27.
128 See Maimon Schwarzschild, Popular Initiatives and American Federalism, or, Putting
Direct Democracy in its Place, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 531, 537–53 (2004) (discussing
“value pluralism” in relation to democracy).
129 See Nathan Teske, Beyond Altruism: Identity-Construction as Moral Motive in Political
Explanations, 18 POL. PSYCHOL. 71, 72–73 (1997).
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value the approval of their acquaintances or social group while some are indifferent to
the disapproval of others.  All, moreover, live within social networks that may profess
a wide variety of normative and behavioral commitments, and the degree to which the
norms and practices of these groups serve as behavioral guides may vary dramatically
from individual to individual.
More than any other variable, this pluralism in baseline behavioral norms may
heighten the relevance of microcontexts to the way in which anonymity affects citizens’
political behavior, thereby creating the conditions for considerable variability of re-
sults.  Citizens who are personally predisposed to act public-regardingly, for example,
or who belong to groups that are committed to public-regarding norms of political
behavior, may continue to act in public-regarding ways even when their words or
actions are cloaked by anonymity.  Citizens who are personally predisposed to act in
private-regarding ways, on the other hand, might behave differently when anony-
mous depending upon the norms of the social groups that influence their behavior
when it is public.  Private-regarding citizens who inhabit social networks that embrace
private-regarding norms may continue to behave private-regardingly when anony-
mous.  On the other hand, citizens predisposed to act private-regardingly but whose
predispositions are normally modulated by social network norms of public-mindedness
might be more likely to indulge their private-minded impulses when their actions
may be taken anonymously.
The same might be said of the effect of anonymity on sincerity and independence:
those predisposed to exhibit these traits might do so even when they speak or act anony-
mously, whereas those whose predispositions run the other way might in some circum-
stances alter their behavior when conditions permit them a measure of anonymity.
3.  Soft “coercion.”  A related contextual factor is the apparent ubiquity of what
I will call “soft coercion.”  Unlike hard coercion, which alters behavior through vio-
lence, bribery, threats, and other forms of external compulsion, soft coercion modifies
behavior through the routine operation of ordinary social forces.130  Notwithstanding
the standard liberal premise of individual autonomy, actual human beings live in social
groups, these social groups embrace certain norms of belief and behavior, and failure
by a member of the group to conform to those norms consequently has “social reper-
cussions”131 for how that individual continues to live within the group.  Decades of
social psychology research has shown the power of groups to demand and enforce
conformity with group norms.132  More recently, political scientists marching under
the banner of social network theory have thoroughly documented the power of social
groups to enforce conformity even in the sphere of politics, in contrast to the premises
130 See Isaak Dore & Michael T. Carper, Multiculturalism, Pluralism, and Pragmatism:
Political Gridlock or Philosophical Impasse?, 10 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL.
71, 79–80 (2002).
131 ELIHU KATZ & PAUL F. LAZARSFELD, PERSONAL INFLUENCE: THE PART PLAYED BY
PEOPLE IN THE FLOW OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS 66 (1955).
132 Cialdini & Goldstein, supra note 120.
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of much democratic theory, which regards democratic processes as intrinsically a
sphere of individual autonomy:
Democratic elections include a substantial element of social coer-
cion.  Electoral campaigns turn citizens’ attention toward politics,
and deviant preferences are brought into correspondence with their
political surroundings.  The election campaign serves as a political
stimulus setting into motion a social influence process, and this in
turn imposes social order on the political chaos of individually
held, idiosyncratic opinions.133
Under these circumstances, “disagreement is always on the verge of being eliminated,
and the only individuals who are equipped to take on the full role of a participatory
citizen are those imbedded within cozy cocoons of like-minded associates.”134
The coercive power of these social forces has obvious implications for assessing
the impact of anonymity on political behavior.  On one hand, group norms will likely
exercise significant influence over the political behavior of group members.  On the
other hand, norms of political behavior may differ considerably from group to group. 
As a result, it is likely to be very difficult to predict how anonymity will affect any
individual’s behavior without knowing a good deal on the ground about the groups to
which the person belongs and where those groups stand on the democratic norms of
sincerity and public-mindedness (we may apparently on this view discard independ-
ence as completely unrealistic).
4.  Framing and priming.  Another apparently ubiquitous aspect of political
behavior is the impact of framing and priming effects.  Facts and issues do not carry
intrinsic moral or political content; such evaluations must be supplied by the voter
through a process of interpretation.135  Framing refers to the presentation of facts and
issues in such a way as to influence citizens to reach one interpretation rather than
another.136  It generally involves weaving facts into an easily understood narrative
133 ROBERT HUCKFELDT & JOHN SPRAGUE, CITIZENS, POLITICS, AND SOCIAL COMMU-
NICATION: INFORMATION AND INFLUENCE IN AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN 96 (1995).
134 ROBERT HUCKFELDT ET AL., POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT: THE SURVIVAL OF DIVERSE
OPINIONS WITHIN COMMUNICATION NETWORKS 6 (2004); see also DIANA C. MUTZ, HEARING
THE OTHER SIDE: DELIBERATIVE VERSUS PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY 3 (2006) (“Those with
diverse networks refrain from participation in part because of the social awkwardness that
accompanies publicly taking a stand that friends or associates may oppose. . . . [I]t is doubtful
that an extremely activist political culture can also be a heavily deliberative one. The best social
environment for cultivating political activism is one in which people are surrounded by those
who agree with them . . . .”).
135 See, e.g., Dennis Chong & James N. Druckman, Framing Theory, 10 ANN. REV. POL.
SCI. 103, 106 (2007).
136 Dennis Chong, Creating Common Frames of Reference on Political Issues, in POLITICAL
PERSUASION AND ATTITUDE CHANGE 195, 200–01 (Diana C. Mutz et al. eds., 1996); Chong
& Druckman, supra note 135, at 104.
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that increases the likelihood that individuals will reach one evaluation of the facts
rather than another.
Priming also influences the process by which citizens reach evaluative judgments,
but it does so by exploiting the fact that individuals generally decide what they think
about a topic not by drawing reflectively on everything they know, but by drawing
selectively and reflexively on whatever information or associations tend to be most
immediately and readily accessible.137  Because people may be invited to make political
judgments in many different circumstances, the information and associations most
likely to come readily to mind may differ from circumstance to circumstance, from
which it follows that the substantive judgments people make on the same topic may
differ as well, depending upon the precise conditions in which they happen to render
the judgment.  As a result, researchers have found, influencing the circumstances in
which political judgments are made—as by selectively directing a voter’s attention to
some matters rather than others in televised political ads—can influence the judgments
that voters make on the merits of political issues or candidates.138
Like the dynamics of social conformity, framing and priming effects seem likely
to have a potentially significant—and highly contingent—role in determining how
anonymity influences political behavior in any given circumstance.  Anonymity is
itself a practice that has framing and priming effects.139  Anonymity frames issues by
erecting a barrier between individuals and the objects of their attention; it invites the
anonymous to think of themselves as distinct from others whom their behavior might
affect.140  At the same time, individuals offered the cloak of anonymity may be primed
to think about themselves in isolation, which could induce them to focus more on their
own independent beliefs and behavioral predispositions rather than on social expecta-
tions.  However, the influence of anonymity’s framing and priming effects on behavior
in individual cases is uncertain because it depends so heavily on the individual’s pre-
dispositions.  Suppose anonymity primes people to focus more closely than does pub-
licity on their own privately held beliefs.  Whether in those circumstances they behave
with greater or lesser public spirit depends entirely on their basic predispositions, which
are variable, shaped by a lifetime of social influences, and may vary from context
to context.141
137 SHANTO IYENGAR & DONALD R. KINDER, NEWS THAT MATTERS: TELEVISION AND
AMERICAN OPINION 4, 65 (1987).
138 Chong & Druckman, supra note 135, at 114–15.
139 Burnham, supra note 80, at 134.
140 Social psychologists even have a name for this phenomenon—“deindividuation”—
which has sometimes been thought to be a condition that facilitates antisocial behavior such
as that exhibited by mobs. A classic account of deindividuation is L. Festinger et al., Some
Consequences of De-individuation in a Group, 47 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 382 (1952).
141 E.g., Jonah Berger et al., Contextual Priming: Where People Vote Affects How They Vote,
105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8846 (2008).
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5.  The low salience of politics.  “The typical American voter,” according to a well-
known study, “knows little about politics, is not interested in politics, does not partici-
pate in politics, does not organize his or her political attitudes in a coherent manner, and
does not think in structured, ideological terms.”142  Another recent study concludes:
The last thing people want is to be more involved in political deci-
sion making: They do not want to make political decisions them-
selves; they do not want to provide much input to those who are
assigned to make these decisions; and they would rather not know
all the details of the decision-making process.  Most people have
strong feelings on few if any of the issues the government needs to
address and would much prefer to spend their time in nonpolitical
pursuits.143
Politics, in other words, simply is not that important an activity to many or even most
Americans.
The generally low salience of politics has potential implications for the effect of
anonymity on citizens’ political behavior.  Because the behavioral effect of anonymity
appears to be so highly context-dependent, in any given situation the precise mix of
personal and social norms and preferences may have considerable influence over how
an anonymous individual behaves.144  But because “norms must be salient in order to
elicit . . . norm-congruent behavior,”145 the low salience of politics for American citi-
zens means that prevailing social norms of overtly political behavior might paradox-
ically play a rather limited role in guiding much behavior that is in fact political.
As Lea, Spears, and de Groot have explained, “[a] person’s behavior in any situ-
ation can be placed along a continuum ranging from entirely personal (conforming to
personal standards) to entirely group-based (conforming to salient group norms and
standards).”146  If group political norms are not highly salient for individuals when they
are acting politically (voting, speaking, signing petitions, contributing, etc.), then their
behavior will likely respond more readily to their personally held behavioral norms.147 
Knowing this, of course, does not permit any conclusions to be drawn about how ano-
nymity will affect behavior because we must first know something about individuals’
142 ERIC R.A.N. SMITH, THE UNCHANGING AMERICAN VOTER 1–2 (1989).
143 JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH DEMOCRACY: AMERICANS’
BELIEFS ABOUT HOW GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK 1–2 (2002).
144 This is especially true under the “balance of forces” model proposed by Connolly et al.:
“[T]he effectiveness of an idea-generating group is determined by a somewhat subtle balance
between facilitative and inhibiting forces, and . . . the balance of these forces can be shifted by
manipulation of . . . member anonymity.” Connolly et al., supra note 113, at 692.
145 Cialdini & Goldstein, supra note 120, at 597.
146 Lea et al., supra note 119, at 527.
147 Id.
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personal behavioral norms.  But the low salience of political norms does suggest the
possibility that anonymity in politics could in general have the effect of driving many
people to behave more nearly in conformity with their personal, internal predisposi-
tions than in conformity with collective norms of good political behavior.  What this
means at a collective level depends of course upon the distribution among the popula-
tion of those whose norms of personal behavior coincide with or diverge from public
norms of political behavior.  But, however these qualities are distributed, it seems to
follow that people who have not internalized behavioral norms of sincerity, independ-
ence, or public-mindedness would be more likely to act insincerely, irresponsibly, or
selfishly when anonymous than when publicly identifiable.
CONCLUSIONS
Whether and to what extent political actions may be performed in anonymity is
a policy choice.  My purpose here has been to take a small, initial step toward iden-
tifying a framework for thinking about how we might evaluate alternative policies
favoring anonymity or publicity in various domains of political life.  I have argued
that the desirability of such policies may be assessed according to the extent to which
they succeed or fail in inducing citizens to behave in ways that are closer to rather than
farther from the consensus norms of ideal democratic behavior, and in particular the
norms of sincerity, independence, and public-mindedness.
Determining in advance the influence that any particular policy of anonymity will
have on citizen behavior, however, turns out to be difficult and uncertain.  The effect
of anonymity on behavior is highly variable and context-dependent.  Whether ano-
nymity will encourage ideal citizen behavior depends on many factors: the individual’s
predispositions and beliefs, the behavioral norms of social groups to which the indi-
vidual belongs, the salience in any immediate context of personal and group norms, the
specific issues in play for the individual, priming and framing effects, and so forth. 
As a result, it cannot simply be assumed that anonymity has an equally prosocial or
antisocial influence on the behavior of every person, in every circumstance, or for the
same reasons; each domain of democratic behavior takes place in a context that may
differ, perhaps significantly, from the context characterizing other such domains.
Although more research is needed to say much with any certainty, it does seem
possible to advance one premise with perhaps some degree of assurance.  If we make
the seemingly innocuous assumption that in a plural society such as ours the behavioral
norms of individuals and groups differ along the dimensions relevant to ideal citizen
behavior, then it seems to follow that policies of anonymity will have little impact on
the behavior of a potentially large number of people, particularly those who fall at
either end of the scale.  Someone predisposed by character to political sincerity, in-
dependence, and public-regardingness, whose social network supports those values,
who is primed before undertaking an activity to act sincerely and public-regardingly,
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and who faces no serious environmental fears associated with participation will likely
act ideally regardless of whether the activity is done anonymously or publicly.  By the
same token, someone whose personal predispositions, group norms, and other influ-
ences consistently favor insincerity or private-regardingness will also behave consis-
tently with those influences whether the action in question is anonymous or public.148
The impact of anonymity policies, then, is likely to be felt mainly in the middle,
among individuals who either are only weakly committed to personal or group norms
of behavior or who are subject to conflicting influences.  Thus, the efficacy of ano-
nymity policies probably depends in large part on the proportion of people who fall
into this middle range, something that only additional research is likely to disclose.
148 To similar effect see Daniel Sturgis, Is Voting a Private Matter?, 36 J. SOC. PHIL. 18,
27 (2005).
